Mikomeseng: leprosy, legitimacy and Francoist repression in Spanish Guinea by Brydan, David
Mikomeseng: Leprosy, Legitimacy and Francoist
Repression in Spanish Guinea
David Brydan*
Summary. The Mikomeseng leprosy settlement in Spanish Guinea (present-day Equatorial Guinea)
was widely promoted during the 1940s and 1950s as the embodiment of the Francoist ‘civilizing
mission’ in Africa. Its prominence reflected the important role which colonial health and social pol-
icy played in establishing the legitimacy of the Franco regime, and particularly in helping to over-
come its international isolation in the immediate post-war era. But a major protest by leprosy
sufferers in 1946 revealed the everyday violence underpinning life in Mikomeseng, showing how
the language of welfare and social justice which pervaded Francoist propaganda masked the reality
of a coercive colonial system. The image of Mikomeseng as the embodiment of benevolent colonial
rule was constructed by Francoist experts and officials around a brutally repressive institution, one
which encapsulated the violence of Spanish colonial rule in West Africa and of the Franco regime as
a whole.
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On 18 February 1946 the residents of the Mikomeseng leprosy settlement in Spanish
Guinea (present-day Equatorial Guinea) rose up in protest against the brutal conditions
they were forced to live under. Mikomeseng, located close to the border of Cameroon,
had been established in 1945 as the primary settlement for the estimated 4,000 leprosy
sufferers in the colony, part of a new anti-leprosy programme launched by the colonial
service of Spain’s Franco regime. The protest was quickly suppressed by colonial author-
ities, and its ringleaders were severely punished. But the subsequent investigation
revealed the brutality of everyday life in the settlement. As the colonial regime’s own tes-
timonies and reports showed, leprosy sufferers from across Spanish Guinea had been
transported to Mikomeseng against their will under brutal conditions, often resulting in
death. They had experienced violence, hunger and neglect in the settlement itself, and
many had been forcibly separated from their new-born children.
Despite this repressive reality, however, Mikomeseng was widely promoted during the
late 1940s and 1950s as the embodiment of the Francoist ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa. A
documentary film produced in the same year as the protest and commissioned by Spain’s
colonial service presented it as a model institution, providing medical and spiritual care,
education and security for its residents, while protecting both new-born children and the
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wider population from the dangers of infection.1 Numerous other articles, books and
films promoted Spain’s successful treatment of leprosy in the settlement, aimed both at
domestic and international audiences. For the Spanish judge and colonial administrator
Rafael Galbe Pueyo, Mikomeseng demonstrated ‘the unprecedented generosity of a col-
onizing nation’, working quietly and modestly to secure the healthy and prosperous
future of its colonial subjects.2
Recent research has shown how, despite the hunger, hardship and repression which
characterised the first decades of the Franco regime, social policy and the language of
social justice were central to Francoist attempts to secure legitimacy and gain popular
support.3 This paper uses the history of Mikomeseng to argue that colonial health and
social policy also played an important role in efforts to establish the legitimacy of the
Franco regime during the 1940s and 1950s. These efforts were not solely aimed at a
domestic audience. Particularly during the period of international isolation which fol-
lowed the end of the Second World War, Spanish officials and experts adopted the lan-
guage of humanitarianism and development deployed by the British and French empires
to position Franco’s Spain as a respectable and progressive colonial power.4
Mikomeseng, leprosy control and colonial health policy more generally, thus played an
important part in efforts to overcome Spain’s post-war isolation.5 The prominent role of
Francoist experts in international leprosy organisations reflected the wider success of
Franco’s Spain in exploiting the idea of its ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa to establish interna-
tional legitimacy.
Spain’s twentieth-century African colonies were extremely small, limited to Spanish
Guinea, a strip of territory along the northern Moroccan coast, and a sparsely inhabited
region in the western Sahara.6 Nonetheless, Spain’s African empire stood at the heart of
Francoist ideology and foreign policy during the early years of the regime. The language
of empire had been central to the discourse of Spanish nationalist and right-wing move-
ments since the ‘Disaster’ of 1898, when Spain had lost its remaining Latin American and
Asian colonies.7 Spain had laid claim to territories in equatorial Africa since the late
1Los enfermos de Mikomeseng, Hermic Films (1946).
2Rafael Galbe Pueyo, ‘Mikomeseng’, Africa, 1955,
165, 11.
3Carme Molinero, La captacio´n de las masas: polı´tica
social y propaganda en el re´gimen franquista (Madrid:
Ca´tedra, 2005); Margarita Vilar Rodrı´guez and Jero`nia
Pons-Pons, ‘The Introduction of Sickness Insurance in
Spain in the First Decades of the Franco Dictatorship
(1939–1962)’, Social History of Medicine, 2012, 26,
267–87; A´ngel Alcalde, ‘Francoist Veterans and the
“New State”: Social Benefits and the Consolidation of
the Franco Regime (Spain, 1938–1945)’, in
Alessandro Salvador and Anders G. Kjøstvedt, eds,
New Political Ideas in the Aftermath of the Great War
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 219–39.
4Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society:
The Labor Question in French and British Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert:
Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies
of British Colonialism (Athens, OH: Ohio University
Press, 2007); Frederick Cooper, ‘Writing the History of
Development’, Journal of Modern European History,
2010, 8, 5–23.
5Florentino Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestio´n espa-
ola, 1945–1950 (Madrid: Aguilar, 1989).
6Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western
Sahara: Background to Conflict (London: Croom
Helm, 1980); Ibrahim K. Sundiata, Equatorial Guinea:
Colonialism, State Terror, and the Search for Stability
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Susana Sueiro
Seoane, ‘Spanish Colonialism during Primo de Rivera’s
Dictatorship’, in Raanan Rein, ed., Spain and the
Mediterranean since 1898 (London: Frank Cass,
1999), 48–64; Marı´a Rosa de Madariaga, Marruecos,
ese gran desconocido: breve historia del protectorado
espa~nol (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2013).
7Gonzalo Alvarez Chillida and Eloy Martı´n Corrales,
‘Haciendo patria en Africa: Espa~na en Marruecos y en el
Golfo de Guinea’, in Xavier Moreno Julia´ and Xose´ M.
Nu´~nez Seixas, eds, Ser espa~noles: imaginarios nacionalis-
tas en el siglo XX (Barcelona: RBA, 2013), 399–432.
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1700s, but did not establish full control over Spanish Guinea—the island of Fernando Po
(present-day Bioko) and the small mainland region of Rio Muni—until the early twentieth
century. Control of the Protectorate of Morocco plunged Spain into a series of brutal and
costly colonial conflicts between 1909 and 1927, which helped to form a generation of
africanista officers and soldiers, including Franco himself, for whom the brutal and brutal-
ising experiences of Morocco shaped their political outlook.8
The role of Morocco and Moroccan troops in securing the rebel victory during the
Spanish Civil War helped to embed this africanista culture at the heart of the Francoist
state, and the new regime initially hoped that the Second World War would provide an
opportunity to expand Spanish territories in the continent.9 These dreams of imperial
expansion were quickly dashed, but Africa and Spain’s imperial status continued to per-
meate Francoist language and thought, particularly in the period before the regime was
forced to cede Moroccan independence in 1956. Indeed, the idea of Spain as a progres-
sive imperial power remained an important part of the self-image and diplomatic strat-
egies of the Franco regime right up until the independence of Spanish Guinea in 1968,
and of the Spanish Sahara in 1975.10
The treatment of leprosy was the ideal vehicle to promote an image of benevolent
Francoist imperialism, both due to the disease’s religious symbolism, and to the new
developments in leprosy treatment which emerged in the aftermath of the Second World
War. Although Gerhard Hansen’s research of the 1870s linking leprosy to the M. leprae
bacillus had transformed traditional understandings of the disease, its historical associa-
tion with Christianity, the Catholic Church, the Order of St Lazarus and missionary work
meant that religious ideas and practices continued to influence approaches to the disease
well into the twentieth century. This was particularly true in Franco’s Spain, where the
state was underpinned by a highly conservative ‘National Catholic’ ideology, and where
the Church played a central role in national life.11 The significance of the disease under
the Franco regime was reflected in the new leprosy institutions and regulations which
were introduced in Spain between 1943 and 1946, which returned leprosy settlements
to the religious orders which had controlled them prior to the Second Republic.12
8Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the
Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
9Sergio Sua´rez Blanco, ‘Las colonias espa~nolas en
A´frica durante el primer franquismo (1939–1959):
algunas reflexiones’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie
V, Historia Contempora´nea, 1997, 315–31; Norman J.
W. Goda, ‘Franco’s Bid for Empire: Spain, Germany
and the Western Mediterranean in World War II’, in
Raanan Rein, ed., Spain and the Mediterranean since
1898 (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Gustau Nerı´n and
Alfred Bosch, El imperio que nunca existio´: la aventura
colonial discutida en Hendaya (Barcelona: Plaza &
Jane´s Editores, 2001).
10Alicia Campos, ‘The Decolonization of Equatorial
Guinea: The Relevance of the International Factor’,
Journal of African History, 2003, 44, 95–116; Mike
Elkin, ‘Franco’s Last Stand: An Analysis of Spanish
Foreign Policy Regarding Moroccan Independence in
1956’, International Journal of Iberian Studies, 2004,
17, 67–86.
11Alfonso Botti, Cielo y dinero: el nacionalcatolicismo
en Espa~na (Madrid: Alianza, 1992).
12Teresa Ballester Artigues and Josep Bernabeu
Mestre, ‘Lepra y sociedad en la Espa~na de la primera
mitad del siglo XX: la Colonia-Sanatorio de Fontilles
(1908–1932) y su proceso de intervencio´n por la
Segunda Repu´blica’, Dynamis, 1991, 11, 287–344;
Rosa Sa´nchez Garcı´a, ‘La lucha contra la lepra en la
Espa~na de primera mitad del siglo XX. Evolucio´n de
las estrategias preventivas basada en los avances
cientı´ficos, sanitarios y sociales’, Asclepio, 1994, 46,
79–92; Josep Bernabeu-Mestre and Teresa Ballester-
Artigues, ‘Disease as a Metaphorical Resource: The
Fontilles Philanthropic Initiative in the Fight Against
Leprosy, 1901–1932’, Social History of Medicine,
2004, 17, 409–21.
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But it was also discernible in the renewed attention given to the disease in Spanish
Guinea, where the treatment of leprosy was also dominated by religious orders and reli-
gious symbolism. The importance of religion to the Francoist leprosy programme
reflected the wider dominance which Christian organisations, beliefs and symbolism con-
tinued to exert over the treatment of the disease across colonial Africa. Recent research
has shown how missionary groups continued to dominate African leprosy care until well
into the 1960s, and how religious organisations took the lead in international anti-
leprosy campaigns.13 The segregation policies and settlements which characterised much
leprosy treatment until after the Second World War provided missionaries and religious
orders with the perfect opportunity to evangelise a captive and vulnerable patient popu-
lation.14 Within these institutions the physical deformities of sufferers were taken to sym-
bolise moral and spiritual failings, with care focusing as much on patients’ spiritual as
their physical well-being. Megan Vaughan has argued that, although not ‘total institu-
tions’ in the Foucauldian sense, leprosy colonies served to project Christian disease sym-
bolism onto African sufferers, creating a decontextualised ‘leper identity’ which rendered
individuals as courageous and stoic bearers of their biblical scourge.15
The establishment of the new Mikomeseng settlement in 1945, however, also coin-
cided with one of the key developments in the modern treatment of leprosy. Prior to the
Second World War most anti-leprosy programmes had continued to revolve around tradi-
tional ideas of settlement and isolation, and medical intervention was limited to the
largely ineffective use of chaulmoogra oil. Research carried out in the USA during the
Second World War led to the discovery of sulfones, which revolutionised the field by pro-
viding the first truly effective treatment against leprosy. The use of sulfones spread across
the world in the immediate post-war years and quickly supplanted chaulmooga oil as the
principle method of treatment.16
Eventually these developments would prompt a shift away from settlements and segre-
gation in the treatment of leprosy, but during the 1950s the success of sulfone treat-
ments within Mikomeseng could be held up by Spanish colonial experts and officials as
evidence of the medical and scientific achievements of Francoist rule. The nature of the
disease and the visible impact of its cure meant that these ‘achievements’ were written
on the healed skin of leprosy sufferers, and could be presented as stark visual evidence of
African progress and development under Spanish tutelage.17 As Michael Worboys has
13John Manton, ‘Global and Local Contexts: The
Northern Ogoja Leprosy Scheme, Nigeria, 1945–
1960’, Histo´ria, Cieˆncias, Sau´de-Manguinhos, 2003,
10, 209–23; Shobana Shankar, ‘Medical Missionaries
and Modernizing Emirs in Colonial Hausaland:
Leprosy Control and Native Authority in the 1930s’,
The Journal of African History, 2007, 48, 45–68;
Kathleen Vongsathorn, ‘Gnawing Pains, Festering
Ulcers, and Nightmare Suffering: Selling Leprosy as a
Humanitarian Cause in the British Empire, C. 1890–
1960’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 2012, 40, 863–78.
14On the history of modern segregationist approaches
to leprosy, see Shubhada S. Pandya, ‘The First
International Leprosy Conference, Berlin, 1897: The
Politics of Segregation’, Historia, Ciencias, Saude—
Manguinhos, 2003, 10, 161–77.
15Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power
and African Illness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1991).
16Fernando Sergio Dumas dos Santos, Letı´cia Pumar
Alves de Souza and Antonio Carlos Siani,
‘Chaulmoogra Oil as Scientific Knowledge: The
Construction of a Treatment for Leprosy’, Histo´ria,
Cieˆncias, Sau´de-Manguinhos, 2008, 15, 29–46. The
emergence of sulfone-resistant leprosy meant that
sulfones were later supplanted by multi-drug treat-
ment programmes.
17On leprosy and the symbolic significance of colonial
skin, see John Manton, ‘Leprosy in Eastern Nigeria
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argued, leprosy treatment served to demonstrate the Christianising mission and the
developmental mandate of European colonialism during the twentieth century.18 At a
time when international critics of the Franco regime denounced it as a backwards and
regressive remnant of interwar fascism, Mikomeseng could be used to align Spain with
this broader European project by portraying it as a Christian, socially-just, and
scientifically-advanced colonial power dedicated to African development.
But the evidence of everyday violence underpinning life in Mikomeseng which
emerged after the 1946 protests demonstrates that the language of welfare and social
justice which pervaded Francoist propaganda masked the reality of a colonial system built
on coercion and repression. Under Francoist rule in Spanish Guinea, a repressive military
regime, backed up by the Church, exercised violent and coercive control over the lives of
the majority of its African subjects, prioritising the supply of cheap, pliant labour to the
major timber and cacao plantations, while strictly limiting basic civic rights and neglecting
social services.19 This was particularly evident in health policy, where authorities in
Spanish Guinea extended a pre-existing regime of sanitary surveillance involving restric-
tive health passports, strict limits on movement and travel, mandatory medical examina-
tion and reporting systems and racially-based intelligence testing.20
In these respects, it differed little from the Spanish colonial regimes which had pre-
ceded it. But it also mirrored some of the unique characteristics of Francoist repression
on the Spanish mainland. Efforts to control the lives of Africans and to mould them into
pliant Catholics citizens of the Spanish ‘New State’ bore parallels to the treatment of for-
mer Republicans and working-class communities in Spain, often themselves depicted as
racially-inferior outsiders. The treatment of leprosy sufferers in Mikomeseng, in particular,
echoed the Francoist use of coercive health programmes, the institutionalisation of chil-
dren from Republican families, and the mass incarceration of political opponents in Spain
itself.21
Using new material from the Spanish colonial archives alongside contemporary films,
books and press reports, this article shows how the image of Mikomeseng as the
and the Social History of Colonial Skin’, Leprosy
Review, 2011, 82, 124–34.
18Michael Worboys, ‘The Colonial World as Mission
and Mandate: Leprosy and Empire, 1900–1940’,
Osiris, 2000, 15, 207–18.
19Much of this was aimed at the ‘espa~nolizacio´n’ of
the colony. See Gonzalo A´lvarez Chillida, ‘Epı´gono
de la Hispanidad. La espa~nolizacio´n de la colonia de
Guinea durante el primer franquismo’, in Ste´phane
Michonneau and Xose´ M. Nu´~nez Seixas, eds,
Imaginarios y representaciones de Espa~na durante el
franquismo (Madrid: Casa de Vela´zquez, 2014),
103–26.
20Rosa Marı´a Medina Domenech and Jorge Molero
Mesa, ‘La ley sanitaria colonial: marco legislativo para
el ana´lisis de la medicina colonial espa~nola en A´frica’,
in Alejandro Diez Torre, ed., Ciencia y memoria de
A´frica: Actas de las III Jornadas sobre ‘Expediciones
cientı´ficas y africanismo espa~nol, 1898–1998’ (Alcala´
de Henares: Ateneo de Madrid, 2002), 391–400;
Rosa Marı´a Medina Domenech, ‘Scientific
Technologies of National Identity as Colonial
Legacies: Extracting the Spanish Nation from
Equatorial Guinea’, Social Studies of Science, 2009,
39, 81–112; Benita Sampedro Vizcaya, ‘La economı´a
polı´tica de la sanidad colonial en Guinea Ecuatorial’,
Endoxa: Series Filoso´ficas, 2016, 37, 279–98.
21Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and
Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (London:
HarperPress, 2012). On the repressive use of health
and medicine under Francoism, see for example
Isabel Jime´nez Lucena, ‘El tifus exantema´tico de la
posguerra espa~nola (1939–1943): el uso de una
enfermedad colectiva el la legitimacio´n del “Nuevo
Estado”’, Dynamis, 1994, 14, 185–98; Michael
Richards, ‘Morality and Biology in the Spanish Civil
War: Psychiatrists, Revolution and Women Prisoners
in Malaga’, Contemporary European History, 2001,
10, 395–421.
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embodiment of benevolent colonial rule was constructed by Francoist experts and offi-
cials around a brutally repressive institution, one which encapsulated the violence of
Spanish colonial rule in West Africa and of the Franco regime as a whole. It will begin by
analysing how those behind the establishment of Mikomeseng saw it as a microcosm of
the ideal Francoist colonial state, and how it was presented as such in Spanish propa-
ganda and publicity in the decade after 1945. It will then use the protests of 1946 to
explore the violence, repression and neglect to which the residents of Mikomeseng were
subject, their causes and effects, and the acts of resistance they provoked. Finally, it will
show how Mikomeseng, the fight against leprosy and colonial health policy more gener-
ally were used to re-establish Spain’s status within the international scientific community
following its period of post-war isolation.
Planning and Propaganda
In 1941, just two years after Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War, colonial health
authorities in Spanish Guinea began to formulate plans for a new approach to the
treatment of leprosy across their territories. In part, their focus on leprosy reflected the
relatively high prevalence of the disease. Health officials estimated that there were
3,000–4,000 leprosy sufferers in the region, out of a total population of under 200,000.
In comparison, Spain itself contained an estimated 2,700–4,500 leprosy sufferers out of
a total population of 25 million.22
The focus on leprosy was not, however, purely the result of careful epidemiological
analysis. The disease’s religious symbolism meant that it enjoyed a high profile among
the profoundly Catholic Francoist administration. Francoist health officials frequently
alleged that the disease and its sufferers had been ‘neglected’ or ‘abandoned’ under the
Second Republic, insinuating that such neglect was rooted in the Republic’s anti-clerical-
ism.23 By focusing on leprosy control, colonial officials and experts could thus exploit the
symbolic value of the disease to promote a distinctive Francoist model of colonial rule. In
particular, they explicitly identified the new leprosy settlement as an opportunity to con-
struct an idealised microcosm of the Francoist colonial regime.24 In a colonial context in
which effective government control was in fact relatively limited and genuine social prog-
ress non-existent, Mikomeseng would represent what the colonial health service
described as a ‘small state within a greater one’, embodying the peace, order and prog-
ress which apparently characterised Francoist rule in Africa.25
Mikomeseng was intended to encapsulate Francoist imperialism in a number of ways.
First, and most importantly, it would establish order and control over the African popula-
tion. Security was the first priority of the colonial government in Spanish Guinea, which
maintained extensive military and paramilitary security forces, administered a complex
22‘Un estudio de la Isla de Corisco’, June 1943, (15)18
81/08109, Archivo General de la Administracio´n
(AGA), Alcala´ de Henares; Memoria del VI Congreso
Internacional de Leprologı´a (Madrid: Gra´ficas
Gonza´lez, 1954), 51–2.
23Director Interino de Sanidad to Gobernador General
de Guinea, 6 August 1941, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
24The idea of leprosy settlements as colonial micro-
cosm was not unique to Spanish Guinea, and has
been explored, for example, in Warwick Anderson’s
analysis of US colonial medicine in the Philippines.
Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American
Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the
Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2006), 158–79.
25‘Memoria del Servicio Sanitario Colonial, 1944’,
(15)18 81/08176, AGA.
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and authoritarian justice system, and sought to govern the everyday lives of its subjects
through the use of internal passports, work permits and restrictive sanitary policies.26
Spanish health officials thus approached leprosy first and foremost as a problem of isola-
tion, monitoring and control. Prior to 1941 officials estimated that only a third of the
total leper population lived within the leprosy settlements which were scattered across
the territory.27 Even within these institutions, Spanish officials complained, the absence
of rigorous segregation meant that lepers were able to come and go as they pleased, fur-
ther spreading the disease by making contact and trading freely with the local popula-
tion.28 The lack of available medications, caused both by wartime shortages and the lack
of funding, meant that many of those who voluntarily moved to the settlements soon
left again.29
As a result, plans for improving treatment revolved around securing a more rigorous
model of segregation and control. An initial proposal drawn up in 1943 recommended
closing all existing treatment centres and converting the small island of Corisco, which
lay off the coast of the Rio Muni estuary, into a new leprosy colony.30 The idea was even-
tually rejected as impractical, and instead local authorities decided in 1944 to close the
existing inefficient segregation camps around the region and to concentrate all leprosy
sufferers in a central settlement at Mikomeseng. The result, according to the colonial
health service, would be ‘more rigorous isolation’ of leprosy sufferers, ‘immeasurably
improved’ health outcomes, and ‘profound effects on the health work of the country’.31
The focus on security and control in Mikomeseng reflected the wider treatment of the
African population in Spanish Guinea, where civic and personal freedoms—from prop-
erty rights to the ability to purchase alcohol—were tightly regulated. But for Spanish offi-
cials and experts, Mikomeseng still encapsulated the supposedly progressive nature of
Spanish colonial rule. Health authorities were keen to stress both the scientific and the
humanitarian credentials of the new facility. Mikomeseng’s new director appointed in
1945, Victor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, argued that modern forms of leprosy treatment had
evolved beyond traditional models of simple incarceration. New facilities such as
Mikomeseng, he claimed, were ‘true sanatoria where the sick find rational care, in many
cases achieving considerable relief for their pain and sometimes even an apparent
cure’.32 A more nuanced understanding of contagion and segregation policies, he
argued, had led to ‘a considerable humanization in the life of lepers’, and meant that
many now voluntarily presented themselves to the colony rather than having to be forci-
bly removed from their communities.33
Alongside the medical benefits for leprosy sufferers, colonial authorities hoped that
the greater level of control they could exert in Mikomeseng would also help to improve
moral standards among patients. Without such control, the Director of Health in Spanish
26Alicia Campos Serrano, ‘El re´gimen colonial fran-
quista en el Golfo de Guinea’, Revista Jurı´dica
Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid, 2000, 3, 79–108.
27Director Interino de Sanidad to Gobernador General
de Guinea, 6 August 1941, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
28Director de Sanidad to Gobernador General de
Guinea, 1 January 1943, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
29Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 20
December 1942, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
30Director de Sanidad to Gobernador General de
Guinea, 1 January 1943; ‘Un estudio de la Isla de
Corisco’, June 1943, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
31Memoria del Servicio Sanitario Colonial, 1944’,
(15)18 81/08176, AGA.
32Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 20
December 1942, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
33Ibid.
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Guinea argued, ‘the lack of morals amongst the indigenous peoples leads to frequent
sexual contact between the sick and the healthy’, contributing greatly to the spread of
the disease.34 African sexuality was a recurring concern for Spanish authorities in Guinea,
and was often blamed for the territory’s social problems.35 Curbing the supposed sexual
promiscuity and lack of self-control among the African population was an integral part of
what the Spanish saw as their ‘civilizing mission’ in the region, inculcating the moral
standards which they regarded as fundamental to a modern developed society. By bring-
ing leprosy sufferers under closer day-to-day control, colonial authorities hoped not only
to provide more effective medical care, but to save their subjects from the negative con-
sequences of their own immoral behaviour.
A key part of this humanitarian mission was the aim of preventing the spread of infec-
tion from leprosy patients to their new-born children. One of the very first proposals to
reform leprosy treatment came from the colony’s Director of Health in 1941, and was
justified primarily by the current inability of medical staff to prevent infection to new-
born children. ‘We, civilized men with a colonizing duty,’ the Director argued, ‘are allow-
ing human beings to begin life without hope, and before their first smile are condemning
them to a world of affliction.’36 As a result of these worries, one of the key features of
the redesigned settlement at Mikomeseng was a care home just outside the settlement
walls where the children of leprosy patients could be removed to prevent infection.37
There they would be cared for and educated by missionary nuns, saved from their pathol-
ogised African origins and raised as healthy Catholic citizens of the Francoist colonial
state. This focus on the health and welfare of children mirrored the emphasis placed on
infant and maternal health within Spain itself, where Francoist authorities aimed both to
increase the overall size of the population and to ensure that children were raised as
healthy, devout and ideologically committed citizens of the ‘New State’.38 By preventing
the children of leprosy sufferers from contracting the disease, colonial health authorities,
like their counterparts in Spain, were thus aiming to forge citizens for the new Francoist
state while also demonstrating their credentials as ‘civilised’ colonisers.
The role of missionaries in children’s care reflected the third key aspect of
Mikomeseng’s status as a colonial microcosm, namely the centrality of religious orders
and the Church within the life of the settlement. Mikomeseng contained a church and a
missionary-run school, both of which featured heavily in publicity and propaganda mate-
rials showing leprosy sufferers attending mass and reading the bible.39 The children’s
34Director de Sanidad to Gobernador General de
Guinea, 1 January 1943, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
35Gustau Nerı´n, Guinea Ecuatorial, historia en blanco y
negro: hombres blancos y mujeres negras en Guinea
Ecuatorial, 1843–1968 (Barcelona: Ediciones
Penı´nsula, 1998).
36Director Interino de Sanidad to Gobernador General
de Guinea, 6 August 1941, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
37Separation of children from their leprous parents was
a relatively widespread global practice at the time,
carried out to a greater or lesser extent in the
Philippines, Latin America and mainland Spain. See,
for example, Warwick Anderson, Colonial
Pathologies, 159; Vicent Comes Iglesia, ed.,
Cuidados y consuelos. Cien a~nos de Fontilles (1909–
2009) (Valencia: Biblioteca Valenciana, 2009), 304–
8.
38Josep Bernabeu-Mestre and Enrique Perdiguero-Gil,
‘At the Service of Spain and Spanish Children:
Mother-and-Child Healthcare in Spain During the
First Two Decades of Franco’s Regime (1939–1963)’,
in Iris Lowry and John Krige, eds, Images of Disease:
Science, Public Policy and Health in Post-War Europe
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
European Union, 2001), 167–86.
39Francisco Javier Martı´nez Antonio, ‘Imperio enfer-
mizo. La singular mirada mo´rbida del primer fran-
quismo en los documentales me´dicos sobre
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care home was run by Conceptionist missionaries, underlining the religious symbolism of
the settlement’s mission to ‘save’ children from infection and the importance attached to
raising faithful Catholic citizens. Mikomeseng’s health facilities were also staffed by both
Spanish and African nuns, a largely self-taught group who had received little or no formal
medical training.40
The prominent involvement of religious orders reflected their dominance of local social
services, which had been largely run by Claretian missionaries since the consolidation of
Spanish rule.41 Both in Spain itself and in the ‘mission countries’ abroad, Spanish religious
orders saw leprosy colonies as ideal sites of conversion, and leprosy sufferers as the per-
fect subjects for their evangelical activities. One lay missionary working in the Spanish
leprosy colony of Trillo praised the patients there for their spirit of ‘happiness and resigna-
tion’, and claimed they were sacrificing their limbs for their love of God.42 The head of
the Spanish Church’s Missionary Society, meanwhile, described institutions such as lep-
rosy colonies and orphanages as ideal sites to ‘create the environment, the climate of
conversion in the pagan countries’.43 Long-term access to patients, particularly children,
in an institution where free movement was strictly limited, provided a perfect opportunity
for Spanish missionaries to spread the faith, and for Francoist colonial authorities to pro-
mote the spiritual dimensions of their ‘civilising mission’.
The organisation of Mikomeseng also mirrored the structure of colonial administration
and the colonial economy in Spanish Guinea as a whole, where absolute European rule
was cloaked in the language of ‘tribal’ self-government and economic policy was geared
towards supporting Spanish autarky. The Governor General of Spanish Guinea nominally
ruled the territory through a network of ‘traditional chiefs’, who were legally responsible
for enforcing order and security at a local level.44 This form of indirect administration
allowed Spain to trumpet its commitment to African autonomy and self-government,
while freeing it from the burden of providing basic services and masking the fact that the
majority of Africans were denied any legal, property or labour rights.45 In addition to
being self-governing, Spanish Guinea was expected to be largely self-sufficient, requiring
minimal financial support from the metropole and supplying raw materials to support the
Francoist pursuit of autarky.46
Following the same model, Mikomeseng was also supposedly governed by a Council
of Chiefs made up of patient representatives responsible for order and administration,
and was divided into a system of ‘tribal villages’.47 Apart from the Spanish medical staff
and missionaries, all other posts were filled by patients, including the nursing team,
Marruecos y Guinea’, Medicina & Historia, 2009, 4,
1–15.
40Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio epidemiolo´gico
y clı´nico de la endemia de lepra en la Guinea espa-
ola (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1954),
22. Efforts to professionalise missionary medicine did
not begin in Spain until the late 1940s, and even
then had a relatively limited reach.
41Gonzalo A´lvarez Chillida, ‘Les missions clare´taines et
l’administration coloniale en Guine´e espagnole’,
Histoire, Monde et Cultures religieuses, 2015, 31,
113–31.
42‘Pra´cticas de enfermeras misioneras seglares en la
leproserı´a de Trillo’, Salus Infirmorum, June 1951, 17,
22.
43A´ngel Sagarmı´naga, ‘>Podemos ser misioneras . . . ?’,
Salus Infirmorum, 1948, 8, 2–3.
44Campos Serrano, ‘El re´gimen colonial franquista’.
45Sundiata, Equatorial Guinea, 32–3.
46Botti, ‘Cielo y dinero’; Sua´rez Blanco, ‘Las colonias
espa~nolas en A´frica’.
47‘Memoria del Servicio Sanitario Colonial, 1944’,
(15)18 81/08176, AGA. The policy of dividing leprosy
settlements along ‘tribal’ lines was shared across col-
onial Africa. See Vaughan, Curing Their Ills.
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cooks, internal police force and maintenance staff.48 The land cultivated by patients was
expected to provide for a majority of the settlement’s food needs. A market allowed resi-
dents to trade the food and goods they produced, both amongst themselves and with
the outside world, using a special metal currency to limit the spread of infection.49
Reflecting Mikomeseng’s alignment with the Francoist quest for autarky, Victor Martı´nez
Domı´nguez hailed its success at supporting such a large number of leprosy sufferers with
such ‘economy for the state’, and suggested it could be used to provide chaulmoogra oil
for all of the leprosy settlements on the Spanish mainland.50 Far from representing a gen-
uine form of patient-led self-government or self-sufficiency, however, Mikomeseng
remained firmly under the control of Spanish authorities. Its gates and boundaries were
protected by a unit of the Colonial Guard to prevent escape and maintain isolation, and
its statutes made clear that the institution’s Spanish Director enjoyed ultimate and
untrammelled authority over all aspects of life inside the settlement.51
Mikomeseng’s combination of order, religiously-infused social provision, self-
governance and self-sufficiency was designed to perfectly encapsulate Francoist colonial
rule in Spanish Guinea. As soon as the settlement had been established it began to fea-
ture heavily in Spanish press and propaganda, with a series of films, books and articles
produced in the decade after 1945 lauding all of these characteristics. The 1946 film The
Sick of Mikomeseng, for example, was produced as part of a series of documentaries on
Spanish Guinea commissioned by the Spanish Department of Morocco and the Colonies
(Direccio´n General de Marruecos y Colonias).52 The film, and others like it which focused
on themes of health, presented Spanish Guinea as a pathologised space of threatening
and disfiguring sickness, but one which the generosity and humanity of the Spanish colo-
nial state and Spanish missionaries were helping to ameliorate. It touched on many of
the themes discussed by those officials involved in planning the settlement, including the
role of missionaries and the Church, isolation and security, the tribal organisation and
self-sufficiency of the settlement, and the removal of children from their infected
parents.53 The film was primarily aimed at Spanish audiences, and was screened in
Madrid cinemas over the course of the following year.
The narrative around Mikomeseng began to change following the introduction of sul-
fone treatment at the end of the 1940s. The drugs were first trialled in Spanish Guinea in
1948, and used extensively from 1949. News of their effectiveness, particularly in com-
parison to previous treatment methods, prompted a wave of voluntary admissions from
across the region from leprosy sufferers who had previously resisted attempts to force
them into the settlement. Whereas publicity surrounding Mikomeseng had previously
48Valentı´n Matilla Go´mez, ‘Una expedicion cientı´fica a
la Guinea’, Medicina Colonial, November 1945, 4,
330.
49Rafael Galbe Pueyo, ‘Mikomeseng’, Africa, 1955,
165, 9–11. This special currency featured heavily in
publicity material about Mikomeseng.
50Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 20
December 1942, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
51‘Memoria del Servicio Sanitario Colonial, 1944’,
(15)18 81/08176, AGA; Martı´nez Domı´nguez,
Estudio epidemiolo´gico, sec. appendix.
52Los Enfermos de Mikomeseng, Hermic Films (1946),
Filmoteca Espa~nola. On the film crew’s expedition to
Spanish Guinea, see Pere Ortin and Vic Pereiro´,
Mbini: Cazadores de imagenes en la guinea colonial
(Barcelona: Altair, 2006).
53For an insightful discussion of the film and its signifi-
cance within early Francoism, see Martı´nez Antonio,
‘Imperio enfermizo’.
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been able to point to its humanitarian and civilisational aspirations, but had been unable
to provide any concrete evidence of effective medical interventions, the dramatic impact
of these new drugs enabled Mikomeseng’s cheerleaders to promote it as both a humani-
tarian and a scientifically advanced endeavour.
This was reflected in a new film, Sanitary Mission in Guinea, which was produced in
1953 by the same director who had made The Sick of Mikomeseng, this time through
the new state documentary film service No-Do, and again funded by the Department of
Morocco and Colonies.54 It appeared alongside a series of books and articles, all written
or informed by Mikomeseng’s director, Victor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, who was also
named as scientific advisor on the film.55 All of these works reproduced the themes
which had been promoted in the 1946 film, but with a new emphasis on the transforma-
tive impact of Spanish medical science on the lives of African leprosy sufferers.
The new film used two techniques in particular to promote Mikomeseng’s humanitar-
ian and scientific credentials. The first was the use of before-and-after images to provide
visual evidence of the success of Spain’s civilising mission in Africa. Sanitary Mission to
Guinea contained lingering images of five Mikomeseng residents, primarily boys and
young men, first showing photographs of their faces covered with leprous boils and
sores, followed by their healed faces after receiving sulfone treatment.56 The images,
claimed the narration, provided ‘evidence’ of the treatment, and left ‘no room for doubt’
as to its efficacy.57 The same images were reproduced both in press articles and in Victor
Martı´nez Domı´nguez’s subsequent book.58 The impact of Spain’s humanitarian and sci-
entific endeavour was written on the faces and the skin of its African subjects, trans-
formed from the ‘horrendous’ and ‘repugnant’ condition in which they had been found,
to healthy, strong and content subjects of Spanish rule.59 Their transformation embodied
the supposed goals of Spanish colonialism in Africa, namely the development of the
native population along the path towards self-determination. As Martı´nez-Domı´nguez
declared, Spain’s hope was that its subjects would ‘come of age healthy, vigorous and
free from scars [lacras]’, and that, after an undefined period, ‘another nation born of
Spain prays to God in Spanish for the peace of its mother country’.60 These young men
transformed from disfigured sickness to unblemished good health thus represented the
journey which Spanish Guinea would (eventually) make from indigenous backwardness
to vigorous, grateful independence.
Alongside these images, Sanitary Mission to Guinea and other Mikomeseng propa-
ganda of the early 1950s made heavy use of epidemiological statistics, something which
had been absent from The Sick of Mikomeseng and other earlier publicity material.
Reflecting the involvement of Martı´nez Domı´nguez as scientific advisor, over two minutes
of the thirteen-minute documentary were dedicated to explaining a graph showing
54Misio´n sanitaria en Guinea, No-Do (1953), Filmoteca
Espa~nola. On the history of No-Do, see Araceli
Rodrı´guez Mateos, Un franquismo de cine: la imagen
polı´tica del re´gimen en el noticiario NO-DO (1943–
1959) (Madrid: Rialp, 2008).
55Rafael Galbe Pueyo, ‘Mikomeseng’, Africa, 1955,
165, 9–11; Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio
epidemiolo´gico.
56Misio´n sanitaria en Guinea, 7.21–8.23.
57Misio´n sanitaria en Guinea, 8.19.
58Rafael Galbe Pueyo, ‘Mikomeseng’, Africa, 1955,
165, 9.
59Ibid.
60Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio epidemiolo´gico, 113.
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annual leprosy incidence, prevalence and mortality rates as they had developed over the
course of the 1940s and 1950s.61 The key message delivered by the narration was the
change which occurred with the introduction of sulfones in 1948, and the dramatic
increase in voluntary admissions it prompted, combined with steadily decreasing mortal-
ity rates.
This section of the film did not make for dynamic cinematic viewing; the convoluted
explanation as to why the increase in incidence rates was in fact a positive reflection of
greater reporting rather than an actual increase in the incidence of the disease was a dif-
ficult one to communicate. But the importance of the graph, as the narrator explained,
was that it ‘expressed such important events scientifically’.62 The Spanish mission at
Mikomeseng was thus presented as a scientific and scientifically-advanced enterprise, a
message reinforced by the prominent attention also given to images of medical instru-
ments and surgical facilities in the institution’s hospital. During an era in which many of
Spain’s leading scientists and medical researchers had fled into exile and the Franco
regime was frequently denounced for its backwardness and obscurantist traditionalism,
Mikomeseng could be used to demonstrate the scientific and technical credentials of
Francoist rule.63
The Dark Side of Mikomeseng
The mass protest of leprosy sufferers in 1946, however, revealed a very different side to
life in the settlement. The origins of the protest, the reaction from colonial authorities,
and the testimonies of those involved suggest that the settlement, and leprosy policy in
Spanish Guinea more generally, was characterised as much by violence, neglect and
repression as it was by Christian philanthropy and medical care. While Spanish experts
trumpeted the lives transformed by the introduction of sulfone treatment in
Mikomeseng, they glossed over those lost through brutal transportation policies and the
forced removal of infants from their mothers. This hidden history of Mikomeseng thus
sheds a very different light on claims that African leprosy treatment demonstrated the
benevolence and efficacy of Francoist colonial rule.
The ‘uprising’, as local authorities labelled it, took place on 18 February 1946. The
nature and extent of the protests are not entirely clear. Although no deaths or major inju-
ries were reported, local officials claimed that thousands of Mikomeseng residents had
taken part in what was an aggressive and violent protest, threatening the life of the
Victor Martı´nez Domı´nguez and other Spanish staff.64 The outbreak of the protests was
met with the swift dispatch of a Colonial Guard force to quell disorder and re-establish
control over the settlement. According to the local administrator who was sent to
Mikomeseng in their wake, the protests had been sparked by anger towards Martı´nez
Domı´nguez, whom residents claimed was responsible for the regime of forced labour,
hunger and physical violence they were subject to. More generally, they complained that
many patients had been in Mikomeseng for years, hearing constant promises that they
61Misio´n Sanitaria en Guinea, 4.45–7.15.
62Ibid., 4.51.
63Josep Lluı´s Barona, ed., El exilio cientı´fico republicano
(Vale`ncia: Publicacions de la Universitat de Vale`ncia,
2010).
64Untitled report, Administrador territorial de
Mikomeseng, 6 March 1946, ‘Incidente en la
Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’, 15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
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would be cured but without their situation improving in any way. The solution, in their
eyes, was the immediate dismissal of Martı´nez Domı´nguez and the introduction of a
new, more humane regime in the settlement.65
Once control of Mikomeseng had been re-established, the Governor General of
Spanish Guinea ordered an investigation into the events, during which more detailed
allegations emerged. In April, a local Spanish practicante (a male medical assistant) work-
ing in Mikomeseng wrote to the Governor General warning of the risks of further out-
breaks of violence.66 In his formal declaration to investigators, he reported that patients
in Mikomeseng were being subjected to a systematic campaign of hunger, forced labour
and assault, designed in part to prevent them from revealing the truth about conditions
there.67 The ‘uprising’, he argued, had been nothing more than a reasonable protest
against these conditions. In its aftermath he claimed that Martı´nez Domı´nguez and the
local administrator had redoubled their barbarous treatment of patients, who were regu-
larly subject to beatings and were threatened at gunpoint if they refused to follow
orders. As a result, individuals within the camps had been heard discussing plans to
attack and kill Martı´nez Domı´nguez and other officials.
According to the informant, the Governor General had been systematically misled by
conditions on the ground. Despite the widespread publicity about Mikomeseng in Spain
and the film which had shown patients being treated in well-maintained concrete build-
ings, he claimed that medical facilities amounted to a few dilapidated palm huts which
were insufficient to care for the number of patients. Most seriously, he alleged that the
process of identifying leprosy patients within the population and transferring them to
Mikomeseng had been carried out in a brutal fashion, with individuals dying from hunger
and mistreatment on the journey, or abandoned to die by the roadside when they could
not walk any further.68
The response of Martı´nez Domı´nguez and of the colonial leadership in Spanish Guinea
was twofold. On the one hand, they dismissed the protest from Mikomeseng residents
on the grounds of their race and their illness. In his report on the initial protests and his
response to the later investigation, Martı´nez Domı´nguez denied all the allegations made
against him, claiming that patients received sufficient food and basic supplies, and that
he had heard no reports of physical punishment or mistreatment.69 The protests against
him, he argued, were the unfortunate consequence of the fact that on his visits to the
centre he was required to reassert the necessary but humane regime of ‘work and disci-
pline’, which in his absence often lapsed into periods of ‘leisure’.70 The ‘simplistic logic’
of the indigenous mind had thus led patients to associate him with imposition of work
and discipline when they could not grasp the importance of it.
Added to these racial deficiencies, Martı´nez Domı´nguez argued, were the psychologi-
cal effects of leprosy. ‘All of the leper colonies of the world’, he reported, had to deal
65Ibid.
66Jose´ Luis Martı´nez Dı´az to Gobernador General de
Guinea, 10 April 1946, ‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de
Mikomeseng’, 15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
67‘Declaracı´on de Jose´ Luis Martı´nez Dı´az, Bata’, 3 June
1946, ‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’,
15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
68Ibid.
69‘Declaracı´on de Dr. Martı´nez Domı´nguez’, undated,
‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’, 15(18)
81/08109, AGA.
70Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 4 March
1946, ‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’,
15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
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with the classic irritable character of the leprosy patient, induced both by the knowledge
that they suffered from an incurable disease and by the stigma attached to it.71 As a
result of this double affliction, patients in Mikomeseng had allowed themselves to be led
astray by a minority of rebellious troublemakers. The deputy governor responsible for
investigating the incident fully accepted these arguments, describing the protests as the
result of the ‘scarce mentality’ and lack of ‘powerful reason’ among the African
population.72
It was these supposed racial and pathological deficiencies which were used to justify
the second aspect of the Spanish response to the uprising: repression and punishment.
The initial protest had been met with the dispatch of armed security forces stationed
nearby. The deputy governor who produced the initial report on the uprising called for
the ringleaders to be handed an exemplary punishment in order to avoid similar events
occurring in the future, on the grounds that the ‘special psychology of the indigenous’
was unable to ‘comprehend a pardon without concluding that [the offence] was justi-
fied’.73 In this he was supported by Martı´nez Domı´nguez, who also lobbied for an exem-
plary punishment to avoid undermining the future work and stability of the settlement.74
On the basis of this advice, the Governor General decided to dismiss the African nurse
who had led the protests, and to commit him to six months in the colony’s disciplinary
brigades. He also sentenced the six other patients identified as ‘ringleaders’ to two
months in prison and a further six months of forced labour in special disciplinary brigades
within Mikomeseng.75 Although this was presented as a relatively humane punishment,
the severity of the forced labour and the mistreatment of the prisoners at the hands of
Mikomeseng officials caused severe hardship for those involved. The convicted six wrote
to the Governor General after four months of labour to request a pardon for the remain-
ing period, on the grounds that they were suffering unduly from the punishment as their
bodies were ‘full of leprosy and ulcers’.76 The request was turned down on the recom-
mendation of Martı´nez Domı´nguez, who argued that a pardon would undermine order.
The wider claims of mistreatment in Mikomeseng were dismissed, and no action was
taken against the institution’s leadership.
These responses reflected the repressive nature of leprosy regulation in Spanish
Guinea, and of health services in the colony more widely. Under the guise of the humani-
tarian imperative to tackle the disease, new leprosy regulations introduced in 1945 had
imposed severe punishments on any sufferers who did not voluntarily turn themselves
over to colonial authorities, or any relatives, neighbours or tribal ‘chiefs’ who did not
report them.77 All those suspected of suffering from the disease were required to submit
71Ibid.
72Subgobernador de la Guinea Continental Espa~nola to
Gobernador General de Guinea, 4 March 1946,
‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’, 15(18)
81/08109, AGA.
73Ibid.
74Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 4 March
1946, ‘Incidente en la Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’,
15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
75Gobernador General de Guinea to Vı´ctor Martı´nez
Domı´nguez, 30 March 1946, ‘Incidente en la
Leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’, 15(18) 81/08109, AGA.
76Note contained in correspondence between
Subgobernador de la Guinea Continental Espa~nola
and Gobernador General de Guinea, 10 July 1946;
‘Incidente en la leproserı´a de Mikomeseng’, 15(18)
81/08109, AGA.
77‘Reglamento vigente de la lucha contra la lepra’,
Boletı´n Oficial de los Territorios del Golfo de Guinea
(15 April 1945).
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to medical examination every six months, and only those certified as being free from lep-
rosy could access government services or apply for government documents or contracts.
Leprosy was thus integrated into the pre-existing regime of sanitary passports which all
(African) residents were required to carry, and which contained information about blood
type and key diseases such as smallpox and sleeping sickness. These authoritarian sani-
tary regulations were a central tool in Spanish efforts to exercise control over the territory
and over the native population, subjecting local residents to mandatory and intrusive
examinations under threat of severe punishments.78 The official regulations governing
Mikomeseng, which were published at the same time as the new leprosy policies, under-
lined the dictatorial powers of the health administration there.79 All disciplinary meas-
ures, the regulations stated, lay solely in the hands of the Director, in this case Martı´nez
Domı´nguez, who could impose any punishments and sanctions he thought fit. Protest or
collective action of any kind was explicitly and strictly prohibited.
The combination of authoritarian control, racist disdain for patients, and a conviction
of the humanitarian value of leprosy campaigns underpinned another disturbing under-
side to life in Mikomeseng: the separation of new born infants from their parents. As we
have seen, the need to protect children from infection had been one of the chief motiva-
tions behind the original expansion of the Mikomeseng, and the process of removing
new born infants from their mothers and taking them to be raised in the missionary-run
children’s home had featured prominently in propaganda about the settlement.
Unsurprisingly, however, the policy was fiercely opposed by leprosy sufferers and pro-
voked widespread resistance. In many cases pregnant women attempted to escape the
settlement, or to hide evidence of their pregnancy and give birth in secret.80
In addition to the distress and medical risks this entailed, the policy also, as Martı´nez
Domı´nguez himself later admitted, resulted in the avoidable deaths of a number of chil-
dren. Of the 226 children born in the settlement between 1946 and 1953, 62 were
removed from their mothers at birth. Although, as intended, this reduced the rate of
infection, 43 of these children died as a result of malnutrition and other diseases exacer-
bated by the fact that they were not breastfed, a mortality rate of over 69 per cent.81 As
a result, the policy had to be modified to allow babies to stay with their mothers for the
first twelve months, increasing infection rates but drastically cutting infant mortality.
The ability and willingness of Spanish health officials to pursue such harmful policies
reflected their particular attitude towards Mikomeseng. For Martı´nez Domı´nguez, the
settlement was a laboratory, a site of ‘true experiment’ as he called it, in which medical
innovations could be tested on a captive and isolated population without fear of profes-
sional or political consequences.82 This outlook mirrored the wider attitude of the
Spanish officials who regarded Mikomeseng as a colonial microcosm, a ‘small state
within a larger one’, where they could build a perfect miniature version of Francoist colo-
nial society around a controlled and corralled population, and use it to demonstrate to
the world the success of Spain’s ‘civilising mission’ in Africa.
78Medina Domenech, ‘Scientific Technologies’;
Vizcaya, ‘La economı´a polı´tica’.
79‘Reglamento del re´gimen interno de la leproserı´a
central’, Boletı´n Oficial de los Territorios del Golfo de
Guinea (15 April 1945).
80Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio epidemiolo´gico, 42.
81Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio epidemiolo´gico, 42–4.
82Martı´nez Domı´nguez, Estudio epidemiolo´gico, 44.
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But the reality of life in Mikomeseng was less a reflection of benevolent Spanish colo-
nial rule than it was of the wider brutality of the early Franco regime. This was evident in
some of the parallels between Mikomeseng and leprosy settlements on the Spanish
mainland. The Valencian settlement of Fontilles was, alongside Trillo, one of the primary
Spanish sites for leprosy care and research, and played a prominent role in Francoist pub-
licity and propaganda.83 The Franco regime had returned Fontilles to the Jesuits following
the Spanish Civil War, and, as in Mikomeseng, religious education and devotion was re-
established at the heart of settlement life. But, as in Mikomeseng, the settlement’s
authorities struggled to retain control over a distrusted and resentful patient population.
The Fontilles leadership suspected that the majority of patients were communist sympa-
thisers, and reported that during the Second World War they avidly followed news of the
conflict on the radio, hoping it would lead to a change of regime. Although there were
significant differences from the situation in Mikomeseng—the leaders of Fontilles had
enjoyed no direct coercive powers and had to petition local civil authorities for help in
maintaining order—a strict new regime was established during the height of Francoist
repression between 1939 and 1945. Personal possessions and agricultural land were con-
fiscated from suspect patients and redistributed to the ‘deserving’, marriage and mixed-
sex interaction between patients was banned, ‘troublemakers’ were expelled and attend-
ance at mass was made compulsory.84
Beyond the realm of leprosy control, the coercive apparatus of Mikomeseng also ech-
oed the wider use of health and social policy in Francoist repression. The child separation
policy, for example, paralleled similar contemporary practices in mainland Spain, where
the children of Republican prisoners were regularly removed from their parents to be
brought up in Catholic families or religious institutions in order to save them from politi-
cal infection, a policy linked to notions of Marxism as both an hereditary affliction and as
a ‘contagion’ which needed to be isolated from mainstream society.85 This practice
formed part of the much wider post-war repression through which the Franco regime
sought to purge Spanish society of all traces of the defeated Republican forces and their
supporters, and to forge a ‘New State’ around the memory of the victorious Civil War
‘crusade’ and traditionalist Catholic values.
In many ways Mikomeseng thus represented a miniature version of the Francoist state
which had been developing on the Iberian Peninsula since 1939. The intolerance of pro-
test and dissent, the violence meted out to those perceived to be challenging the regime,
and the neglect of living standards despite the lofty propaganda rhetoric of social justice
were all features of the Franco regime which were mirrored within the walls of
Mikomeseng. The settlement was indeed a microcosm of Francoist rule, but not in the
way its founders intended.
‘An example to the world’
Despite the violence of life in Mikomeseng revealed by the 1946 protests, the Franco
regime continued to hold it up as an exemplar of its civilized values and commitment to
83Comes Iglesia, Cuidados y consuelos, 272–316.
84Comes Iglesia, Cuidados y consuelos, 293–6.
85Ricard Vinyes Ribas, Montserat Armengou Martı´n
and Ricard Belis i Garcia, Los ni~nos perdidos del fran-
quismo (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 2002); Michael
Richards, ‘Spanish Psychiatry c. 1900–1945:
Constitutional Theory, Eugenics, and the Nation’,
Bulletin of Spanish Studies, 2010, 81, 823–48.
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African development. Much of the propaganda built around Mikomeseng and colonial
leprosy treatment was aimed at promoting the success of Francoist colonialism to a
Spanish audience. But it also increasingly included a comparative international dimen-
sion, one which emphasised Spain’s superiority to other European imperial powers while
also suggesting that it was Spain’s imperial status which justified its standing within the
international community.
In the case of the successful new sulfone treatment, it was clearly impossible to claim
that the drugs were the result of a Spanish scientific discovery. Nevertheless, publicity
materials suggested that Spain was unique in its willingness to meet the costs of provid-
ing new treatment. The No-Do film of 1953 highlighted the great costs which the
Spanish state had borne in providing medicines and medical supplies to the patients of
Mikomeseng.86 An article published by the jurist and colonial administrator Rafael Galbe
Pueyo in the same year claimed that colonial authorities had paid 4 million pesetas
towards the construction of new buildings in the facility, and an additional 2 million pese-
tas annually to provide sulfones—an act of ‘unprecedented generosity’ from a colonial
power.87 During the Second World War, officials had worried that the lack of available
leprosy medication in Spanish Guinea was prompting many of those who had voluntarily
entered leprosy settlements to leave, often crossing over into neighbouring territories to
access more effective treatment from American missionaries.88 To reinforce the idea of
Spanish exceptionalism, Mikomeseng propaganda efforts now emphasised the fact that
new patients were arriving from outside of the borders of Spanish Guinea, suggesting
that neighbouring territories under British and French control were unwilling or unable to
offer similar levels of care.
This comparative argument was made explicit at the end of the Sanitary Mission to
Guinea film. ‘Do not forget’, began the final scene, ‘that today leprosy is cured! And cel-
ebrate as well, the fact that Spain can hold up before the community of nations the work
that it is carrying out in the colony of Guinea.’89 The international dimension to publicity
surrounding Mikomeseng reflected the extent to which the Spanish government and
Spanish health officials saw leprosy, and the wider field of colonial health, as a means to
demonstrate Spain’s credentials as a civilised and civilising global power. Even before the
end of the Second World War, Spain’s leading colonial medical expert, Luis Na´jera
Angulo, had argued that Spain’s historical affinity and geographical proximity to Africa
would make it an indispensable partner in any future efforts to coordinate international
and inter-imperial health on the continent.90
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the international condemnation
of the Franco regime on account of its fascist origins and the diplomatic isolation which
followed made the goal of promoting Spain as a civilised colonial power even more
urgent. Spain was excluded from the newly-formed UN and its specialised agencies in
1946, as well as from most other international scientific organisations and networks. The
technical and humanitarian discourse surrounding international health, however, made it
86Misio´n sanitaria en Guinea, 10.45.
87Galbe Pueyo, ‘Mikomeseng’, 11.
88Untitled report, Vı´ctor Martı´nez Domı´nguez, 20
December 1942, (15)18 81/08109, AGA.
89Misio´n sanitaria en Guinea, 12.57.
90Luis Na´jera Angulo, ‘La sanidad pu´blica y la coloniza-
cio´n africana’, Revista de Sanidad e higiene publica,
July 1944, 18, 298–304.
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the ideal field for Francoist officials and experts to argue against Spanish exclusion.
Global health emergencies such as the post-war polio epidemic provided opportunities
for the Franco regime to establish itself within the international system, with Spanish
experts helping to legitimise the regime by attending international conferences and
working with international organisations.91 As the advent of the Cold War began to
ameliorate criticism of the Franco regime, the World Health Organization was one of the
first international organisations to accept Spanish membership in 1951.92
In this context, leprosy’s religious and cultural associations allowed the regime to
present itself as both scientifically advanced and socially progressive, while also reminding
the international community of Spain’s ‘glorious’ imperial past. As the Director of the
Spanish Institute of Colonial Medicine, Valentı´n Matilla Gomez, argued at the end of
1945, Mikomeseng was an ‘example to the world’, and a key part of the Spanish colonial
health system which demonstrated ‘both to neighbouring colonies and to the whole
world, that Spain continues to be the generous, selfless, civilizing and evangelizing nation
it has always been’.93
This international dimension to Spanish leprosy propaganda and the importance of the
field in helping to overcome Spain’s post-war isolation was most clearly evident in the
International Leprosy Congress held in Madrid in 1953. The congress was one of the first
international scientific events ever hosted by Franco’s Spain. Welcoming 400 delegates
from over 40 different countries, and supported by the WHO and UNESCO, it was held
up by the regime as evidence of Spain’s successful re-integration into the international
scientific community. The original decision to host the event in Spain had been taken at
the previous conference held in Havana five years earlier, influenced both by the historical
ties between the Spanish and Latin American medical communities, and by concerted
lobbying by Francoist health authorities.94
The organisers of the conference, including leading Spanish leprosy experts, the
Spanish Foreign Affairs and Interior ministries, and the Department of Health, also saw it
as an opportunity to promote the scientific and social credentials of the regime to the
outside world, organising extensive tours of medical facilities and providing evidence to
delegates of the supposed triumphs of Francoist public health.95 Mikomeseng featured
prominently in these efforts, with Martı´nez Domı´nguez presenting a paper on the suc-
cesses of the settlement, and exhibitions, including the ubiquitous before-and-after pho-
tographs, promoting Spain’s achievements there.96
For Francoist officials such as the Director General of Health, Jose´ Palanca, the field of
leprosy was an ideal means to promote Francoist medicine to the wider world.
Addressing the opening session of the congress, he told delegates that Spain had worked
91Marı´a Isabel Porras, Marı´a Jose´ Ba´guena and Rosa
Ballester, ‘Spain and the International Scientific
Conferences on Polio, 1940s-1960s’, Dynamis, 2010,
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so hard to ensure the international conference came to Madrid because ‘we wanted to
show you our medical achievements and our campaign against leprosy, which we in
Spain carried out alone, without anyone’s help and despite difficult economic condi-
tions’.97 The treatment of leprosy, he argued, was unique in combining ‘a strict scientific
character’, with the ‘humanitarian, altruistic and disinterested qualities’ which character-
ised Spanish medicine.98
The uniqueness of Spanish medicine, according to his argument, lay in its combination
of advanced technical expertise with the socially progressive and humanitarian principles
which underpinned the Francoist state. The Interior Minister, Blas Pe´rez Gonza´lez, told
delegates that the care of lepers was an integral part of Spanish history, highlighting the
humanitarian efforts of historical figures from El Cid to the Reyes Cato´licos.99 This proud
history, he argued, was reflected in the expertise of contemporary Spanish leprosy
experts and in the advanced state of leprosy treatment under the Franco regime, follow-
ing its neglect under the Second Republic. The importance of the conference in marking
the end of Spain’s post-war isolation was clear from his closing address. By attending the
conference, he argued, delegates would be able to learn the ‘truth of Spain’, particularly
in the social field, and would help to end Spain’s patient wait for this truth ‘to impose
itself on international relations’.100 These sentiments were clearly reciprocated by many
of the conference’s delegates. Representing the WHO, the Italian tropical medical expert
Mario Giaquinto argued that the conference demonstrated ‘the interest that [Spain] has
in the solution of health problems, and the value of its cultural and scientific contribution
to international efforts’.101
The Madrid leprosy conference reflected the wider success of Francoist experts and
health authorities in using the field of leprosy to re-establish their status on the interna-
tional stage. Their ability to mobilise support from Latin American colleagues in order to
secure Spain’s hosting of the conference, as well as the large number of Latin American
delegates who travelled to Madrid in 1953, demonstrated the important role Latin
America played in providing a gateway for Spanish participation in wider forms of inter-
national health during the post-war period. A new Ibero-Latin American College of
Dematology (Colegio Ibero-Latinoamericano de Dermatologı´a; CILAD), for example,
which had first been discussed in Havana and was given the green light to expand by del-
egates at the Madrid conference, was dominated by Spanish leprosy experts and part-
funded by the Spanish government.102
Beyond the Ibero-American region, leprosy was also the first field in which Francoist
experts were able to establish a leading role within international health organisations.
The Spanish dermatologist and president of CILAD, Jose´ Gay Prieto, was appointed in
1959 as the first head of the WHO Leprosy Unit, leading the organisation’s global cam-
paign against the disease which included extensive work in Africa.103 In doing so he was
97Memoria del VI Congreso, 51.
98Memoria del VI Congreso, 50.
99Memoria del VI Congreso, 126–9.
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the first Spanish expert, other than exiled Republicans, to be appointed to a senior posi-
tion within the WHO.104 Prieto’s rise reflected the prestigious position Spain enjoyed
within the WHO’s anti-leprosy programme more generally. Between 1957 and 1958, for
example, recipients of WHO fellowships from as far afield as Turkey, Yugoslavia and
French West Africa were sent to Spain to study leprosy treatment, and in 1959 the WHO
agreed to implement a leprosy eradication programme across the Iberian Peninsula
through its technical assistance programme.105
Although Prieto’s professional background was in Spain itself rather than its colonial
territories, his international prominence provided opportunities for other Spanish leprosy
experts to establish roles within the WHO. Among them was Victor Domı´nguez
Martı´nez, who despite the brutality of the regime he had presided over in Mikomeseng,
went on to work with the WHO Leprosy Unit and sit on the WHO expert committee on
leprosy during the 1950s and 1960s.106 His professional success reflected the significance
of colonial health to the legitimacy of the Franco regime. In the same way that medicine
and public health in Spain were used to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy despite the
repressive realities of Francoist biopolitics, so Mikomeseng and the treatment of leprosy
helped to boost Spain’s international status regardless of the brutality of life both in the
settlement itself, and in Spanish Guinea as a whole.
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